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THE school year has opened auspiciously, with an increase of
three in the registration. The official figures are (figures for
last year in brackets).: Graduate Students, 3 [1i]; Seniors,
52 [70] ; Middlers, 52 [42]; Juniors, 87 [69]; Special Students, 3
[2] ; total, I97 [i94]. The large increase in the Junior class is
especially gratifying. The only changes to be noted are that
Prof. Wurts is teaching the classes in junior evidence, Mr. C.
H. Harriman, '99, is Junior Quiz Master, and Dr. W. F. Foster
has been chosen Secretary of the Faculty in place of Prof.
Beers, whose private engagements made it impossible for him
to give the time necessary for the office work. It is a source
of gratification that President Hadley is giving his course
of lectures on Railway Management, though the number of
lectures has been reduced to six.
The school is honored in the election of Prof. Simeon E.
Baldwin to the Presidency of the International Law Associa.
tion, to succeed Sir Richard E. Webster, Attorney-General of
England. Judge David Dudley Field is the only American
who has held this position.
COMMENT.
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN ENGLISH COURTS.
We are in receipt of an important and interesting decision of the Court of
Appeals of the Supreme Court of Judicature (England) reversing the decision
of the Chancery Division in the case of Sarah Elizabeth Pemberton v.
Hughes. The material facts of the case were that the plaintiff, while a resi-
dent of the State of Florida. was married there according to the laws thereof
to one Erwin. Four years after the marriage Erwin sued the plaintiff for and
obtained a decree of divorce. The decree stood as a final and subsisting
decree. Two years later, Erwin being still alive, plaintiff married one Pem-
berton, and they lived together as man and wife until the death of Pemberton.
Under a power to charge certain estates in England with an annuity in favor
of any woman he should marry, he, by his will, made plaintiff the appointee.
The defendants, who claimed the estates, disputed the validity of the
appointment, asserting that the decree of divorce was void under the laws of
Florida. The ground of their contention was that the subpcena issued to Mrs.
Pemberton (who was then Mrs. Erwin) did not leave ten clear days between
the date of the writ and the time for appearance in the suit for divorce. The
evidence showed that such irregularity in practice and procedure would in any
court of Florida be considered as rendering a decree of divorce null and void.
In the present case the defendants claim that there being no valid divorce,
there was no valid marriage between Pemberton and his so-called wife, and
that hence she had no right to the jointure granted to her under the will of
Pemberton The case was originally tried in Chancery Division before Judge
Kekewich, who decided that the divorce was invalid. In his opinion he
declared that the preponderance of evidence of the expert witnesses called for
the defendants was undoubted in establishing that such error in the serving of
the subpoena would render the decree void for want of proper jurisdiction.
The reasoning of the Court of Appeals reversing this decision may be thus
summarized It by no means follows that the judgment of the Florida court
was rendered absolutely void by reason of the defect in process, or that. stand-
ing unimpeached by a higher court, it would be considered invalid in a
collateral proceeding in a Florida court. Even assuming that such judg-
ment would be considered as void in such a collateral proceeding, it does not
afford a sufficient reason that the same should be considered as a nullity in an
English court, which looks only for a violation of substantial justice. Pro-
vided a court has territorial competence and jurisdiction, its competence in
other respects is not regarded as material by English courts. Competency of
a court from an international, and not from a municipal point of view, deter-
mines the validity of a judgment, and therefore it is not dependent on the
exact observance of the court's own rules of procedure. A judgment of a for-
eign court having jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter-i. e., having
jurisdiction to summon the defendants before it, and to decide such matters as
it has decided--cannot be impeached in England on its merits, although there
may be an error in procedure. (According to this declaration no consideration
is given to the possibility that such an error in procedure might gloss over that
very essential lack of jurisdiction over either the person or subject matter.) A
decree of divorce altering the status of the parties concerned, and affecting the
legitimacy of their afterborn children, is much more like a judgment in rem
than a judgment in personam, and, therefore, the decisions on foreign judgments
in rem should be the guides in determining this case. As no collusion in obtain-
ing the divorce is shown, there is no ground upon which an English court can
refuse to recognize the validity of the decree of the Florida court.
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This decision may be regarded as an indirect contradiction to the general
rule regarding foreign judgments in existence at the present day, which has
been given clearness and definiteness by a vast series of English and American
decisions. At present it is well settled that a judgment rendered by a court of
competent authority and jurisdiction is absolutely conclusive as to the merits
of the controversy which it settles, and to that extent is binding upon the
courts of all other States and countries, and will be recognized by them as evi-
dence of the facts decided. Moreover, at the present day there is no distinc-
tion made between judgments in rem and judgments in personam of foreign
courts, but all are given the same credit. Therefore, it has always been con-
sidered that valid judgments will be both recognized and enforced if they are
of such a character as to be given recognition and enforcement in the jurisdic-
tion where they were pronounced. But it is here that the first distinction is to
be found. It must always appear that there have been propur proceedings and
notice to the parties in order to give the judgment conclusiveness in a foreign
jurisdiction. Bradstreet v. NelAtune Ins. Co., 3 Sumner (U. S.) 6oo, is the
earliest case of authority in this country. Furthermore, there has never been
any doubt of recent years that a foreign judgment may under all circum-
stances be impeached for want of jurisdiction, either over the person or the
subject matter, and in this country the rule is not changed, even by the "full
faith and credit" clause in the United States Constitution. These questions
were all gone into very thoroughly by the counsel on either side in the trial of
this case in the Court of Appeals, yet with the result that the court unani-
mously handed down the decision finding that a judgment pronounced by a
foreign court will be considered final in English courts, and that English
courts will never investigate the propriety or validity of the proceedings of
such court unless they offend against English views of substantial justice.
Consequently a judgment, though void in law in the country where it is pro-
nounced, will not necessarily be so regarded in England. There is no doubt
that neither the court nor the counsel on either side were in agreement as to
the principles laid down in the leading cases cited, viz.: Vanquelin v. Bouard,
15 C. B. N. S. 341; Castriue v. Inrie, 23 L. T. Rep. 48; Doglioni v. Cris-
Pin, 15 L. T. Rep. 44.
Lindley, M. R., said in part: "The court which pronounced the decree
ought to be credited with knowing what irregularities, if any, were fatal to its
jurisdiction and what were not, and the court had before it all the materials
necessary for forming a judgment, and oversight or carelessness ought not to
be presumed by us. * * * Assuming that the defendants are .right,
and that the decree of divorce is void by the law of Florida, it by no means
follows that it ought to be so regarded in this country. It sounds paradoxical
to say that a decree of a foreign court should be regarded here as more effica-
cious or with more respect than it is entitled to in the country in which it is
pronounced. But this paradox disappears when the principles on which Eng-'
lish courts act in regarding or disregarding foreign judgments are borne in
mind. If a judgment is pronounced by a foreign court over persons within its
jurisdiction and in a matter with which it is competent to deal, English courts
never investigate the propriety of the proceedings of a foreign court, unless
they offend against English views of substantial justice. Where no substan-
tial justice, according to English notions, is offended, all that English courts
look to are the finality of the judgment and the jurisdiction of the court in this
sense and to this extent, viz., its competence to entertain the sort of case
which it did deal with, and its competence to require the defendant to appear
before it."
COMMENT.
It would seem very much as if the distinction here introduced is so subtle
and so without foundation as to have perverted the proper application of the
general principles hitherto applied to the recognition of foreign judgments.
The learned judge, whose opinion has just been quoted, himself admitted in
another place that the courts of England do not enforce foreign judgments of
courts which have no jurisdiction in the sense above explained, i. e., over the
subject matter or the persons brought before them, but claims that the juris-
diction which alone is important is the territorial competence over the subject
matter and the parties. If this were true any or all of the essential points of
procedure in courts of law might be omitted or only partially performed, and
yet a decree of the court would be considered valid. The truth of the matter
seems to be that the existing, valid jurisdiction of any court is territorial in
nature, and in any case is dependent upon the established procedure and the
statutory enactments governing that court whose jurisdiction is under investi-
gation. This being so, any defect of a technical nature will render the juris-
diction of the court void, and any decree under such void jurisdiction abso-
lutely invalid. Justice Lindley, citing the cases of Castrique v. Zmrie, 23
L. T. Rep. 48. and Messina v. Petrocochino, 26 L. T. Rep. 561; reiterates the
proposition that a judgment of a foreign court cannot be impeached on its
merits, but seems to stop there, and omits to notice that both those cases
acknowledge in common with Schibsby v. Westenholz, 24 L. T. Rep. 93, that
the jurisdiction of the court of a foreign country may always be inquired into
in order to ascertain whether the laws of the State were conformed to in mak-
ing the decree of court, or whether it was unduly or irregularly obtained. If
these latter facts appear, the judgment in question is considered null and void.
The English cases, too numerous to mention by name, which were cited as
authority for the view that "English courts are bound to receive a judgment
of a foreign court without inquiry as to its conformity or nonconformity with
the laws of the country where it was pronounced," are by no means in con-
tradiction to the leading case of PhilliAs v. Hunter, 2 H. Bl. 402, in which
Lord Chief Justice Eyre draws the very distinction which escapes, apparently,
the attention of Justice Lindley, and which was the basis of the general rule
prevailing until the present case. Justice Eyre said in part, ,In one way only
is the sentence or judgment of the court of a foreign State examinable in our
courts, and that is when the party who claims the benefit of it applies to our
courts to enforce it. When it is thus voluntarily submitted to our jurisdiction
we examine it as we do all other considerations of promises, and for that pur-
pose we receive evidence of what the law of the foreign State is, and whether
the judgment is warranted by that law." In brief, if it is proved that a
foreign judgment is invalid because of some defect in procedure or in practice,
the judgment is considered as not being in existence, and evidence substan-
tiating this is always admissible in a court of another country. But if no such
claim is made the verity of the judgment will stand -unimpeached, as would
the present judgment of the court of Florida, had not the question of the non-
existence of the judgment as a judgment been raised. The only way in which,
under the prevailing rule, the defendants could have been estopped from dis-
puting the validity of the decree of divorce would have been on the ground
that they were parties to the proceeding in Florida, and as this was not the
fact, a refusal of the court to receive evidence adverse to the validity of the
decree is inherently in opposition to the rule prevailing up to the present
time.
The fundamental consideration upon which has rested the right to attack
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the jurisdictional power of a foreign court has been that otherwise a citizen of
one country could not avoid the effect of a judgment rendered by such court,
when same is brought up in a proceeding in another court, without going back
into such foreign jurisdiction, and there have the same reversed. This has never
been required by English or American courts. Thus when Justice Lindley
asserts thaf the errors of the Florida court should have been rectified by im-
peachment in Florida, he seeks to invoke a duty never before recognized by
English courts.
RIGHT TO ENJOYMENT OF STREAM-PERCOLATING WATERS.
The Court of Appeals of New York extends the rights of riparian owners
in Smith v. Brooklyn, 54 N. E. 787. Smith owned land on which there was
and had been a pond and natural water-course. The city of Brooklyn, to
secure water for municipal purposes, established, on land of its own, at a
distance of about 2,400 feet. an aqueduct and reservoir, which it supplied with
water by means of a conduit and a system of wells, pumped by powerful
steam-suction pumps. When the conduit was laid the stream failed percepti-
bly, and when the pumping station was put in operation disappeared. Both
stream and pond have remained dry ever since. The jury found that the acts
of the defendant had caused the disappearance of the pond and water-course.
In final affirmance, the Court of Appeals, all concurring and speaking by
Gray, J., says: "The right of this plaintiff to the enjoyment of his running
stream and to his pond was absolute. The diversion of the water therefrom
was established as a fact by the verdict, and the right of the former to main-
tain the action for the recovery of .damages was clear."
The doctrine that the owner of land has it to the sky and the lowest depths
was very clearly modified as to water-courses in Shury v. Piggott, 3 Bust. 339,
where Whitlock, J., says: "Ways or commons * * may become extinct
by unity of possession, because the greater benefit shall drown the less.
* * * but a water-course doth begin ex jure nature, and cannot be
averted." But Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, denied the right or inter-
est of the owner of land, through which water flowed in a subterraneous
course, sufficient to enable him to bring action for its diversion by an adjacent
owner. Where, however, these subterranean waters are the principal or only
source of supply of a water-course on his land, what are the rights of the par-
ties? Greenleafv. Francis, I8 Pick 117, held the right of the first owner par-
amount, "unless he was actuated by a mere malicious intent to deprive his
neighbor of the water without a benefit to himself." Parker v. B. &- M. R.,
3 Cush. 107. The next distinction made was between a subterranean flow of
water so well defined as to constitute a regular and constant stream and perco-
lations. The former were capable of a right of enjoyment in the person on
whose land they issued as a spring and could not be diverted. Smith v.
Adams, 6 Paige 435. But the owner of land had no right of action against a
neighboring owner who diverted, without malice or negligence, the mere per-
colations of his own land, even though a spring was destroyed thereby.
Wheatly v. Baugh, 25 Pa. St. 528. It does not follow that each land owner
has the entire and unqualified ownership of all water found in his soil, not
gathered into natural water-courses in the common acceptation of that term.
The rights of each land-owner being similar, and his enjoyment dependent
upon the action of other land-owners, these rights must be valueless unless
exercised with reference to each other, and are correlative. Each is restricted,
therefore, to a reasonable exercise of his own rights and a reasonable use of his
own property. Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N. H. 569.
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This was the basis of the decision of Hatch, J. (in x8 App. Div. Rep.
341), and we think it a sound one. The maxim, Sic utere uo., etc., applied
to the facts, harmonizes the American cases. The English cases refuse to
apply this doctrine to percolating waters where the rights of riparian owners
in a defined water-course are not involved. Chaseman v. Richards, 7 H. L.
349; Bradford v. Pickles, i8g5 Appeal Cases 587.
Civilization must move from absolute individual rights and absolute owner-
ship to correlative rights and ownership reasonably restricted. While, there-
fore, we approve the decision of the case upon the facts found by the verdict,
we question the propriety of stating an "absolute right of enjoyment" in a
water-course, unless it is used in the sense of vested or individual. U. S. v.
Nortway, 17 Fed. Rep. 65. The plaintiff had rights in his stream, the city
of Brooklyn had rights in the percolations of its land. When it was estab-
lished that these percolations fed almost exclusively the plaintiff's stream,
their rights became correlative and the city was bound to show that its acts
were a reasonable use of its land with due care.
GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES AS TRADE-MARKS.
In Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, we find the general law as to the use
of geographical names for trade-marks laid down that no one can apply the
name of a geographical district to a well known article of commerce, and
obtain thereby such an exclusive right to the application as to prevent others
inhabiting the district or dealing in similar articles coming from the district,
from truthfully using the same designation. Until lately no exception to this
general rule has been recognized as established law in this country. The
United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, however,
has recently handed down a decision in the case of American Waltham Watch
Co. v. Sandman, 96 Fed. 330, that considerably modifies the views formerly
held on this point. In this case the defendant began the manufacture of
watches in Waltham under the name of "Columbia' Watch Company" and
stamped his watches with the name of this fictitious corporation and the words,
"Waltham, Mass." His object in locating at this place was for the avowed
purpose of using the name "Waltham" in order that he might thereby reap
the benefits of the labor of the original Waltham Watch Company, who hail
succeeded in making the "Waltham watch" known the world over. In a suit
in equity for an accounting and an injunction, a decree was entered in favor
of the plaintiff. The court in reaching this conclusion recognizes that a
geographical name may acquire a secondary meaning that entitles it to the
protection of the law. By long use and association with the manufacture of
an article it may come to be a means of designating that article and as such
acquire the value and invoke the protection accorded to a trade-markl We
find this point arising in the case of Sexio v. Provezende, L. R. I. Ch. 192,
but not until the case of Mlontgomery v. Thompson, 1891 App. Cases 217, was
it very fully discussed. The Massachusetts Supreme Court followed this
latter case in Waltham Watch Co. v. United States Watch Co., 53 N. E.
141. and the reasoning there of Judges Knowlton and Holmes seems to have
had great influence upon the circuit court in the present case. The case
before us is important as tending to establish a line between meritorious
claims that have come into conflict. The principle that one can not
appropriate a geographical name as against any one else manufacturing
a similar article in the same place is a just one. But should even a right
as strong as this be allowed to cover an intentional fraud on the public?
It is the protection of the public that is aimed at. Not being in a favorable
position to protect itself, the court considers its protection a duty incumbent
upon it, and that a greater injustice would be done if it did not afford such
protection than if it merely set limits upon a well established rule of law.
The element of intentional fraud upon the public is the feature that the courts
have grasped in order to set this limit, and a stronger one it would be hard to
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find. As the law reaches a higher development, the establishment of limits
to general principles become its predominant feature, and the present case is
simply an illustration of this tendency.
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION-INHERITANCE TAX.
That an inheritance tax is constitutional has long since been affirmatively
decided by the great weight of authority. But the opinion handed down by
the court in In re Stanford's Estate, 58 Pac. 462, is not only instructive, but
settles for California, at least, that such tax, though it never came into the pos-
session of the State, but was due the State, belongs to the State; and decides that
a legislative act exempting individuals and certain private corporations from
the payment of this tax is void, as being in direct conflict with the State con-
stitution, prohibiting the Legislature from making a gift of any public money
or thing of value. (Overruling In re Stanford's Estate, 54 Pac. 259.) The
facts in this case were as follows: Leland Stanford by his will left large legacies
in favor of the Leland Stanford Junior University and to certain of his nephews
and nieces. A few days previous to Stanford's death a legislative enactment
went into effect which provided for the payment of a collateral inheritancetax
on property devised to certain classei: The tax so imposed was to become due
and payable at decedent's death. In April, 1896, the Superior Court of San
Francisco made an order on Stanford's executrix, requiring her to make pay-
ment of the tax due on the collateral bequests under the will. From this
order an appeal was taken. In 1897 the Legislature amended the original act
by exempting from such tax certain persons and classes (under which certain
legatees under the Stanford will were included), and provided that such
exemptions " shall apply to all property which has passed by will, succession
or transfer since the approval of the act of which this act is amendatory,
except in cases where taxes have been paid."
On thehearing of the appeal (54 Pac. 259) it was heldthat such appeal must
be determined in accordance with the amendment, and that inasmuch as the
amendment in question extended to every part of the State and applied to
every person within a class, the same was in effect a general law and there-
fore did not conflict with the constitutional provision which in terms applied
only to local or special laws. In the case under review the court, however,
reaches a different conclusion, and hold that though in form the act in ques-
tion may not be local or special' legislation, yet the framers of the constitu-
tion, and the people who adopted it, did not hedge about the Legislature
with such restraints in the matter of conferring favors, or making gifts or
donations by special and local legislation, and at the same time leave the door
wide open for similar abuses to enter under the guise of general legislation.
A contention was made that as the State had not come into possession of
the tax, there could be no violation of such constitutional provision, inasmuch
as the State could not give what it had never possessed. The fallacy of such.
contention is apparent when considered from the standpoint that it is only by
virtue of statute that an heir is entitled to receive any of his ancestors' estate,
and that it is in the power of the Legislature to provide that the whole or only
a portion shall go to the heirs or other beneficiaries upon the death of the
ancestor. This being so, and as all the property of a decedent must vest in
some one at his death, if the law provides that only a certain portion can go
to the heirs or other beneficiaries, the remainder being reserved to the State as
a tax on the right of succession, it of necessity follows that such remainder
must vest in the State at the same time that the other property vested in the
heirs or beneficiaries. The State, therefore, has a present fixed right of
future enjoyment to such a tax, and this is property or a thing of value belong-
ing to the State. It is not possession alone, but the right to possess, which
constitutes ownership. Inasmuch as the State's right to such a tax after it is
due is property, it seems apparent that any legislation which releases such
right would be in conflict with a constitutional provision forbidding the releas-
ing or extinguishing of the indebtedness, liability or obligation to the State.
It would also seem to the average mind a-pernicious piece of legislation to
exempt those who had not paid the tax and not to exempt those who had com-
plied with the law, as it would appear to set a premium upon the non-fulfill.
ment of an obligation and the imposing of a penalty upon those who obeyed
such a statute.
